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Abstract
Incentive salience is a motivational property with ‘magnet-like’ qualities. When attributed to reward-predicting stimuli
(cues), incentive salience triggers a pulse of ‘wanting’ and an individual is pulled toward the cues and reward. A key
computational question is how incentive salience is generated during a cue re-encounter, which combines both learning
and the state of limbic brain mechanisms. Learning processes, such as temporal-difference models, provide one way for
stimuli to acquire cached predictive values of rewards. However, empirical data show that subsequent incentive values are
also modulated on the fly by dynamic fluctuation in physiological states, altering cached values in ways requiring additional
motivation mechanisms. Dynamic modulation of incentive salience for a Pavlovian conditioned stimulus (CS or cue) occurs
during certain states, without necessarily requiring (re)learning about the cue. In some cases, dynamic modulation of cue
value occurs during states that are quite novel, never having been experienced before, and even prior to experience of the
associated unconditioned reward in the new state. Such cases can include novel drug-induced mesolimbic activation and
addictive incentive-sensitization, as well as natural appetite states such as salt appetite. Dynamic enhancement specifically
raises the incentive salience of an appropriate CS, without necessarily changing that of other CSs. Here we suggest a new
computational model that modulates incentive salience by integrating changing physiological states with prior learning. We
support the model with behavioral and neurobiological data from empirical tests that demonstrate dynamic elevations in
cue-triggered motivation (involving natural salt appetite, and drug-induced intoxication and sensitization). Our data call for
a dynamic model of incentive salience, such as presented here. Computational models can adequately capture fluctuations
in cue-triggered ‘wanting’ only by incorporating modulation of previously learned values by natural appetite and addiction-
related states.
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Introduction
Incentive salience [1,2] is a mechanism to explain motivational
values of specific learned stimuli (Pavlovian conditioned stimuli)
and associated natural rewards (unconditioned stimuli) in humans
and animals [3–5]. The incentive salience framework postulates a
fundamental dissociation in brain mechanisms between reward
‘liking’ and reward ‘wanting’. ‘Liking’ is the hedonic impact or
pleasure associated with the receipt of an immediate reward while
‘wanting’ is incentive salience itself: a motivational magnet quality
that makes the conditioned or unconditioned stimulus a desirable
and attractive goal [6,7]. Psychological incentive salience is
actively attributed by brain systems to a sensory stimulus,
transforming it from a mere sensory representation into a ‘wanted’
and attractive incentive capable of grabbing attention and
motivating approach, seeking and consumption behaviors. Al-
though nonhedonic, unlike ‘liking’, which reflects the pleasure or
hedonic impact of the stimulus, incentive salience (‘wanting’) is still
motivational.
The incentive salience of a cue is established by learning
Pavlovian S-S associations between a cue (conditioned stimulus or
CS) and its reward (unconditioned stimulus or UCS). However,
the incentive salience framework also postulates a difference
between learning and ‘wanting’: especially evident as post-learning
dissociations between the previously learned values of a stimulus
and its motivational value at a later moment [1,2,7–9]. Incentive
salience can dynamically change, being generated afresh each time
the stimulus is re-encountered and incorporating into the
computation a second source of input besides previously-learned
cached values. This second source of input is physiological state,
which includes natural hunger or thirst appetite and satiety states,
drug-induced states such as intoxication priming, withdrawal and
permanent sensitization, and states of brain mesocorticolimbic
systems (often involving dopamine) translate these physiological
states into motivation. In this paper we focus on the dynamic
nature of this interaction between learned and physiological inputs
that combine to modulate motivation.
Importantly, physiological modulation of cue-triggered incen-
tive salience can occur immediately when a state changes, without
necessarily any need for additional learning. The most convincing
example occurs when a never-before experienced physiological
state, such as a specific appetite, modulates cue-triggered
motivation appropriately for a previously learned Pavlovian cue
[2,3,9–14]. Natural specific appetites, such as salt appetite,
dynamically and appropriately modulate incentive salience or
‘wanting’ triggered by their own reward cues. Conditioned stimuli
associated with salt, food, or drink rewards [3,5] are thus
modulated in incentive salience value (in parallel with the
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but perhaps even more strongly [15]).
The underlying physiological mechanism of incentive salience is
postulated to involve mesocorticolimbic brain systems that involve
dopamine activation [2]. The relationship to brain dopamine
states makes incentive salience vulnerable to enhancement by
psychostimulant drugs that activate dopamine systems. Enduring
neural sensitization of dopamine-related mesolimbic systems
induced by repeated exposures to drugs is the basis for the
incentive-sensitization theory of drug addiction [7]. Sensitization
of dopamine-related systems by binging on drugs such as heroin
and cocaine is thought to produce long-lasting hyper-excitability of
the brain’s mesocorticolimbic system and to result in compulsive
‘wanting’ to take drugs and in cue-triggered relapse. Sensitized
‘wanting’ may effectively trigger relapse even when addicts may
not derive much pleasure from the drugs, nor expect to derive
much pleasure, and even long after the addict is free of withdrawal
symptoms.
One implication of the dependence of incentive salience on both
previously-learned Pavlovian associations and the current physi-
ological state is that the motivation values of learned cues may
vary from what was previously learned. The incentive value of a
cue will equal the learned value if and only if the physiological state
during testing is similar to the state during learning. When
physiological states shift, the motivational value may be trans-
formed from the learned value, either up or down, even if the cue
and reward have not yet been experienced in the new state. The
new ‘wanting’ value is revealed when the cue is re-encountered
again. Thus, incentive salience maps onto decision utility triggered
by a reward cue. This decision utility can be changed by shifts of
physiological state without necessarily changing either the
remembered utility of the reward previously associated with that
cue, the predicted utility of expected future rewards, or the hedonic
experienced utility of those rewards when eventually consumed
[2,9,16].
The distinction between decision utility and remembered/
predicted utility places a firewall between motivation and learning
that protects the integrity of learned values. Cached values for
Pavlovian associations do not need to be rewritten in order to
explain changes in incentive salience. Further, cognitive predic-
tions of future value need not be distorted by fluctuating appetite
states.
At the same time, the firewall allows the incentive salience of the
same Pavlovian cues to be more labile, and to change more in
lockstep with relevant physiological shifts [17,18]. A consequence
is that an individual can have a change in ‘wanting’ without
necessarily changing expectations of future liking, as well as
without changing actual ‘liking’ of the reward when it occurs.
Thus, incentive salience may sometimes be magnified to the point
that produces ‘irrational wants’ where decision utility is strongly
elevated over the concomitant predicted utility. This mismatch can
have a dire outcome, such as when drug addicts who have
unwittingly caused mesolimbic sensitization in their own brains
may persist irrationally in cue-triggered pulses of ‘wanting’ to take
drugs, even when they recognize cognitively that the drug may not
be very pleasant, not worth the costs, and they wish to abstain [7–
9]. Such elevations in ‘wanting’ can occur without necessarily any
fluctuation in learned associations or in cognitive predictions of
reward value.
Incentive salience and dopamine prediction error models
of reward learning
Incentive salience is essentially a Pavlovian motivational
response: it takes Pavlovian associations as its learned input.
Potential differences between cached valence and motivation
values for Pavlovian cues have been previously noted by
computational modelers and learning theorists [14,18–22]. For
example, Dayan and Balleine noted that, ‘‘Pavlovian CRs are …
directly sensitive to the level of motivation of the subjects, such as
whether or not they are hungry. This motivational or affective
control argues against simple realizations of the critic in which
there is one set of weights or parameters (whatever their neural
realization) mapping from stimulus representations (i.e., units
whose activities are determined by the stimuli shown to the
subject) to the values’’ (p. 288, [14]).
Here we aim to account for such motivation variations by
identifying incentive salience computations that dynamically
determine Pavlovian motivation value. These computations must
integrate Pavlovian learned inputs with the status of the brain
mesolimbic mechanisms that reflect current physiological states
(hungers, drug intoxication, sensitization, etc.).
To see the difference between the vantage points of incentive
salience compared to reward learning, it may be helpful to review
how cached values are established in contemporary reinforcement
learning models. For example, the temporal-difference (TD)
method provides an explicit ‘‘model-free’’ formula for estimating
expected reward. It is model-free in the sense that it does not
involve an internal model or cognitive map of the world, but
depends only on cached experiences and the accumulated state for
estimating the value function. The estimate is based on summed
values from reward prediction errors – the discrepancy between
the reward expected from a stimulus (technically, a state) and the
reward actually received [20,23–29]. One influential neurobio-
logical view identifies the predictive error signal, which lies at the
core of temporal difference learning, with the firing of dopami-
nergic neurons projecting to the nucleus accumbens and
neostriatum [30,31] (though this notion is not without controversy
regarding the causal role of dopamine systems in generating
prediction errors and value estimates [2,32]). The actor-critic
architecture, along with the TD-based learning rule, carries great
computational power. It provides, at least theoretically, a
consistent and effective scheme to solve the so-called ‘‘dynamic
programming’’ problem [33] concerning optimization for sequen-
Author Summary
Reward cues are potent triggers of desires, ranging from
normal appetites to compulsive addictions. Food cues may
trigger a sudden desire to eat before lunch, and drug cues
may trigger even a ‘recovered addict’ to relapse again into
drug taking. But learned cues are not constant in their
motivating power. Food cues are more potent when you
are hungry, and drug cues may become overwhelmingly
potent to an addict who tries to take ‘just one’ drink or hit,
precipitating an escalating binge of further relapse. These
changes in cue-triggered desire produced by a change in
biological state present a challenge to many current
computational models of motivation. Such modulation can
even be unlearned (though the modulation interacts with
cues acquired through learning), in that the modulation
instantly follows a physiological or neurobiological change
(hunger, drug hit, etc.), altering the cue’s ability to trigger
desire for a relevant reward. Here we demonstrate
concrete examples of instant modulation and propose
how to build computational models of cue-triggered
‘wanting’ to better capture the dynamic interaction
between learning and physiology that controls the
incentive salience mechanism of motivation for rewards.
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without the need of an elaborate model of the world (i.e., how
states unfold successively and how one’s actions affect such state-
transition) [27,31,34–36].
The TD error model also has been applied to incentive salience
[26]. A first step was taken by McClure, Daw and Montague, who
used the concept of prediction error-driven learning, and equated
cue-triggered ‘wanting’ with the cached Pavlovian learned value
acquired by the TD method [26]. Their model postulated
incentive salience to function as a cached, cumulative reward
value, which, if a reward was suddenly revalued, could be changed
only by further relearning about a new prediction error by re-
encountering the UCS. They suggested that ‘‘the role of dopamine
in learning to attribute such expectations to situations that are
predictive of reward and in biasing action selection towards such
situations as the formal counterpart to the ideas of Berridge and
Robinson about the role of dopamine in attributing and using
incentive salience.’’ p. 425, [26]. While a useful contribution that
exploited the TD model’s strengths to capture trial-by-trial
‘reboosting’ of ‘wanting’, we believe it is only an initial step
towards modeling incentive salience.
Despite the computational success of actor-critic architecture,
several theorists have suggested, as noted above and consistent
with our view here, that additional mechanisms must be added to
explain emerging psychological and neurobiological data and to
account for motivation because the simple form of actor-critic
architecture produces a rigidly incremental cached value of
prediction [14,37,38]. One solution to account for immediate
state-based changes in behavior has been to posit that dopamine
also modulates the ‘‘vigor’’ of all responses in a general fashion
[37,38]. Additionally, uncertainty or generalization decrements
after a state change has been suggested to explain some reduction
in behavioral responses, at least for changes that devalue a reward
downwards [39]. Another alternative solution is to sidestep the
model-free cached limitations and add an entirely separate model-
based (e.g., cortically-embedded) mechanism for reward prediction
in the form of a model-based or tree-search system that explicitly
represents the world as a cognitive ‘‘state space’’. Such a cognitive
model includes goal values and act-outcome (A-O) relationships,
and which can adjust instrumental behavior more flexibly, at least
once a new goal value is known by experience [14,17,18,21,22,39–
41].
Still, cue-triggered ‘wanting’ differs from all the above, and we
believe may more accurately capture the chief motivation function
of brain mesocorticolimbic systems. The re-computations of the
incentive salience for a Pavlovian CS may in some cases be carried
out in a highly dynamic, stimulus-specific and stimulus-bound
fashion, as will be described below. This is possible because of
Bindra-Toates rules of Pavlovian motivation that underlie
incentive salience [3–5]. Those rules are distinct from both cached
TD values and model-based cognitive predictions.
Cached values and model-based predictions of reward both
often assume that a reward will be about as good in the future as it
was in the past [14,22,26,40]. Robust computational theories exist
for those cached model-free values and cognitive model-based
systems, but not yet for Bindra-Toates computations of incentive
salience. A similar sentiment was recently expressed by Dayan and
Niv, ‘‘Unfortunately, the sophisticated behavioral and neural
analyses of model-free and model-based instrumental values are
not paralleled, as of yet, by an equivalently worked-out theory for
the construction of Pavlovian values.’’ (p. 191) [22].
Our goal here is to take a small step towards a better
computational theory for Pavlovian-guided generation of incentive
salience. Specifically, we aim for a model able to compute cue-
triggered ‘wanting’ even for novel physiological modulations that
occur before there is an opportunity for relearning the altered
reward. We also aim for a model that can account for ‘irrational
wanting’ in addictions; that is, for excessively ‘wanting’ a reward
even when knowing its future value to not deserve intense
motivation.
Consistent with contemporary views, we believe that multiple
reward-related learning processes exist within a single brain,
mediated by separable brain systems [7,14,17,18,21,22,38–40,42–
45]. We presume these reward learning-motivation mechanisms
occur in parallel as three separable processes (S-S Pavlovian-
guided incentive salience, S-R cached habits, and model-based
cognitive expectations). Our model is meant to capture only
incentive salience transformations, which takes Pavlovian CS-UCS
associations involving rewards as the primary learned input for
Bindra-Toates modulations.
Incentive salience and dynamic shifts of value
Our view of incentive salience calls for the dynamic computa-
tion of ‘‘incentive value’’ of a conditioned or unconditioned
stimulus, where (a) the CS stimulus has previously been associated
with the relevant UCS; and (b) the value is gain-controlled
moment to moment by fluctuations in relevant physiological states
(including neurobiological states of brain mesocorticolimbic
systems).
Recall that in reinforcement learning, the expected total future
discounted reward (or simply average reward value) V associated
with a state s (i.e., the conditioned stimulus) is
V(st)~S
X
i~0
cirtziT~SrtTzcSrtz1Tzc2Srtz2Tz   , ð1Þ
where c[½0,1) is the discount factor, rt, rt+1, rt+2 …, representing the
sequence of primary rewards starting from the current state
(subscripted t), and the expectation Æ?æ is taken over possible
randomness in environmental state transition and reward delivery
(the bracket sign around primary reward values will be omitted
below for clarity). The estimated value of reward prediction ^ V V
(denoted with a hat) is a value gradually acquired by the agent
through temporal difference learning over a series of experiences
in which the predictive CS and UCS reward are paired. The
acquisition of reward estimate ^ V V is based on computing a
prediction error d correcting any experienced deviation from
consistent successive predictions:
dt~rtzc^ V V(stz1){^ V V(st) ð2Þ
and then updating ^ V V according to d^ V V(st)!dt. The value function
V is essentially an incrementally-learned associative prediction of
each state. As mentioned, one previous computational proposal for
incentive salience equated this value function V, defined by Eqn
(1), with the motivational concept of CS incentive salience [26],
and gradually altered motivational value by increments in V in
each trial produced by prediction error at the moment when
reward UCS was received, via the temporal difference error
variable d, defined by Eqn (2). The TD error d was identified with
the ‘‘reboosting’’ process of a CS posited by the incentive salience
hypothesis to occur at the moment of UCS [1,46]. Reboosting was
a concept added a decade earlier by the original incentive salience
proposals to account for the gradual decrement effects on
rewarded behavior produced by administering neuroleptic drugs
that partially blocked dopamine receptors (anhedonia-like effects
or extinction mimicry) [47]. In such a conceptualization, the
Computational Model of Incentive Salience
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reinforcement value of such a conditioned stimulus acquired
through TD prediction-error learning.
Methods
Ethics statement
All animal work was conducted according to relevant University
of Michigan, NIH, national and international guidelines.
A computational model for incentive salience: k factor
for dynamic physiological shifts
We suggest additionally that a model of incentive salience
should also incorporate dynamic physiological modulation by
current states to capture more sudden changes in CS motivational
value, such as in specific appetites or drug enhancement of
‘wanting’, which do not proceed by gradual reboosting via UCS
prediction errors [1,2,48,49]. In these conditions, a CS’s
motivationally-transformed incentive salience value may dramat-
ically diverge from cache-generated predictions of reward [10,12–
14,40,44,50]. In at least some cases these physiological revisions of
value can occur without any need of relearning about the change
in UCS hedonic impact to revise CS-UCS predictions, yet still be
so powerful as to completely reverse the incentive value of a CS.
In the following, we will first propose a model for incentive
salience that can incorporate dynamic modulation of cue-triggered
‘wanting’ by even novel physiological states. Next, we will show
how such a model maps onto empirical evidence for dynamic
modulation in examples of natural appetite, amphetamine
intoxication, and addiction-related sensitization.
To describe our model of incentive salience more precisely, here
we propose that, respecting the difference between motivation and
learning, incentive salience computations incorporate a physiological factor k
that modulates the value of a CS associated with a relevant UCS (which carries
a reward value of rt). The k factor reflects current physiological state
(hungers, satieties, drug states, etc.). The role of k is to allow
incentive salience of an associated CS to be dynamically
modulated by physiological factors relevant to future rewards
(e.g., hungers, satiety, drug intoxication, mesolimbic sensitization,
etc.).
Model
We suggest that the incentive salience or motivational value
~ V V(st) of the current state in the presence of a reward CS is
~ V V(st)~~ r r(rt,k)zcV(stz1) ð3Þ
Equation (3) represents a generic model for incorporating the
motivation factor k which modulates the learned representation of
primary reward and hence the notion of incentive salience, where
k is a positive constant that varies with behavioral state. Here~ r r(:,:)
is a generic two variable function which, in the following
discussions, will be specialized to either of two forms (sub-types),
as described below.
~ r r(rt,k)~krt ð3aÞ
~ r r(rt,k)~rtzlogk ð3bÞ
Below, we refer to k as the ‘‘gating parameter’’ for incentive
computations involving physiological manipulations for a previ-
ously learned CS (e.g. hunger, thirst, salt appetite, etc.), with k,1
representing devaluation (such as satiation), and k.1 representing
enhancement (such as appetite or sensitization). When k=1 our
model reduces to the conventional temporal difference model; that
is, when physiological state remains constant across training and
test.
When physiological state changes from training to test, one of the
twospecial versions ofEquation 3 will apply, and whichof thetwois
most appropriate will depend on the situation (Figure 1). Equation
(3a) describes a specific subtype in the form of a multiplicative
mechanism, appropriate for most situations where motivation
changes from low to high or vice versa without changing valence —
reward is manipulated between 0 and a positive value, changing
incentive salience from neutral to ‘wanted’ (or from ‘wanted’ to
neutral). In these cases, k is a gain-control factor that scales up (i.e.,
magnifies, when k.1) or down (i.e., shrinks, when k,1) the
incentive salience of the reward.
Equation (3b) describes another subtype in the form of an
additive mechanism, appropriate for other situations where
incentive value not only changes but reverses valence between
positive and negative — this can additionally account for any
special cases in which a reward value changes polarity from
positive to negative or from negative to positive. In those cases, the
logk term moves the baseline of the incentive salience value, which
can be shifted either up (i.e., increases ‘wanting’, k.1) or down
(i.e., decrease ‘wanting’, k,1). This allows polarity reversal from a
negative value to a positive value (with k much larger than 1), or
vice versa (with k closer to 0).
The reason why we include both an additive and a
multiplicative version of modulation in Equation (3) is to more
sensibly achieve real-life reversals than can be accomplished in a
purely multiplicative model by simply changing the k valence
polarity to negative. This is because merely changing polarity in a
multiplicative Equation (3a) would invert the rank order when
multiple reward stimuli in the same family were involved (e.g. 3
concentrations of salt). That would revalue the respective order of
the series in ways that might be unrealistic. For example, reversing
valence in a multiplicative model would cause the reward that was
originally most highly liked and ‘wanted’ of all to become the most
highly disliked or repulsive after devaluation of all; an interme-
diately liked reward would become intermediately disliked, while a
nearly neutral reward stimulus would remain nearly neutral after
polarity reversal. Such re-ordering fails to describe what happens
in empirical cases of valence reversal, where the originally most
liked reward may often still remain the best of a bad lot, becoming
the least disliked as a physiological manipulation changes the
valence of the entire group.
By contrast, an additive model as expressed in Equation (3b),
allows the ‘best’ stimulus to remain best relative to the others, even
if their absolute values may switch valence (i.e., all shift across
zero). Specific candidates for polarity reversal include reversals in
reward values from nasty to nice, such as described below where
an intensely salty taste reward is re-encountered during a salt
appetite, or from nice to nasty such as after taste-aversion
devaluation [10,50–52] (Figure 1). Polarity reversal would
similarly encompass cases in which motivational salience changes
valence between desire and dread [53,54].
We remark in passing that we use logk instead of k for the
additive Eqn (3b) simply to have the same parametric represen-
tation in the additive case as the multiplicative case. Also note that
we only consider additive and multiplicative mechanisms which
together generate the group of (positive) affine transformations on
reward values (this is the class of transformation that keeps the
optimal policy invariant [55]).
Computational Model of Incentive Salience
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mechanism, the incentive value ~ V V is related to the average reward
V (i.e., total reward including current and all future-discounted
rewards) via
~ V V(st)~krtzc
X
i~0
cirtz1zi
 !
ð4Þ
In essence, Eqn. (4) is an expression of what is known as the
‘‘quasi-hyperbolic’’ discounting model encountered in economics
literature [56,57]. The proposal here exploits the two parameters
in the quasi-hyperbolic discount model format and is the basis of
our current postulate of a gain-control mechanism to implement
incentive salience computations, in a manner that can be sensitive
to inter-temporal comparisons of values when such comparisons
play important roles [58], cf. [59]. In simple terms, our model of
incentive salience ~ V V(st) reduces to V(st) in the absence of
devaluation/sensitization manipulation (k=1). The modulatory
factor k is assumed to be independently controlled by the
geometric temporal discounting under c, though it is possible that
such changes can be coupled. For example, sensitization or an
increased physiological appetitive state (k becomes greater than 1)
might lead to a decrease in the temporal horizon c [60], producing
sharper temporal discounting effects, such that motivational value
increases with degree of temporal proximity to reward UCS [61].
Note that the incentive value of a state st is the motivationally-
modulated value ~ r r of the immediate reward rt plus the discounted
value of the expected reward in the next state st+1; both these are
loaded into the goal representation as st is presented.
Shielding learned values from physiological
modulation. One reason for our current model to treat k as
a multiplicative or additive parameter is that we wish to strongly
distinguish incentive salience as a motivation value which
integrates learning and physiological inputs from the stable,
purely-learned and cached value V per se (or for that matter even
Q value). Both V and Q require learning to establish, become
cached once learned, and as stable memory values both are
shielded from moment-to-moment modulation by an animal’s
motivational state. By contrast, incentive salience is modeled here
with the feature of being able to globally modulate the on-line
evaluation of previously-learned values of a primary reward
evoked by a CS.
Specific k’s determine what to ‘want’. It is important to
note we conceive k to be specific to a particular appetite state and
to its own relevant UCS reward and CSs. There can be different
values of k at any given time for different CSs that are associated
with different reward UCSs (food, salt, water, sex etc.). This
specificity includes specific natural appetites, such as salt, hunger,
thirst, etc; as well as mesolimbic sensitization involved in drug
addiction. Each appetitive system would specifically modulate the
Figure 1. Simulations of dynamic shifts in incentive salience. All are induced by changes in physiological state after learning a CS-UCS
association in an initial state (Eqn 3). The left column is for multiplicative mechanisms (Eqn 3a), while the right column is for additive mechanisms
(Eqn 3b). The top row is for shifts after learning a Pavlovian association with a reward UCS (e.g., sucrose taste), and the bottom row is for shifts after
learning with an aversive UCS (e.g., intense salt taste). Initial learning is assumed to proceed by a Rescorla-Wagner type of rule initially [20]
(t=0,1,…,10) as described by the equation V(t)=A (12exp (2t/t)), with asymptote A=1.3 for appetitive reward and A=21.3 for aversive reward, and
the time constant t=3. At time step t=11, a new motivation manipulation is introduced, such as by a shift in a physiological state relevant to the
reward. The change in incentive salience occurs as indicated by the arrows, either multiplicatively (V*k) or additively (V+log k), where k (for illustrative
purpose) takes the values 5,4,2,1, 0.7, 0.2, 0.1. See Eqn (3a,3b) of the manuscript. Colored lines in the upper-left panel describes Experiment 2 (drug
sensitization and acute amphetamine administration), while the lower-right panel depicts Experiment 1 (salt appetite). Note that additive modulation
can reverse reward valence, while multiplicative modulation maintains the original reward valence and changes only magnitude.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000437.g001
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appetite) and simultaneously modulate most powerfully specific
CSs associated with its UCSs. This specificity of k modulation
gives a basis for why drug addicts mostly ‘want’ drugs, binge eaters
mostly ‘want’ food, sodium deficient individuals mostly ‘want’ salt,
and so on. Still, under some conditions, incentive salience may spill
over from one appetite state to modulate CSs for another appetite
state. For example, some cocaine addicts may also show a degree
of hyper-sexuality, compulsive gamblers may show other
addictions, and drug sensitization may sometimes enhance the
motivational value of natural rewards (see below).
In sum, we propose that the computational substrate for
incentive salience must instantiate 1) k, an online gain or baseline
control (collectively called ‘‘gating’’) mechanism that can be
dynamically modulated by changes in physiological or neurobio-
logical states to target motivation towards a relevant CS along with
2) possible adjustment of the temporal horizon c for evaluating
stored prediction values. Both substrates are assumed to be
adjustable from moment to moment by physiological states,
without necessarily requiring new (re)learning.
Neural bases for incentive salience in mesocorticolimbic
circuits
The incentive salience hypothesis specifically proposes that
Pavlovian-guided attribution of incentive salience is mediated
principally via subcortically-weighted NAcc-related circuitry
involving dopamine neurotransmission, which pass signals through
the ventral pallidum. These circuits include input from mesolimbic
dopamine projections from ventral tegmentum and substantia
nigra to the nucleus accumbens, ventral pallidum, and amygdala;
and output projections from nucleus accumbens that converge
through ventral pallidum [62–64]. From ventral pallidum these
signals then pass to a thalamic relay for return to mesocortico-
limbic loops, or directly descend to other subcortical outputs
[62,65,66]. In addition to receiving mesolimbic outputs, dopamine
projections from VTA also ascend directly to ventral pallidum
[67,68]. Thus the incentive salience hypothesis views incentive
salience or ‘wanting’ to be influenced by dopamine-related
modulations of function within this circuit, the output of which
passes through ventral pallidum as a limbic ‘final common path’.
The computational approach suggested here can therefore be
tested empirically by measuring neural signals carrying incentive
salience in the final common path through ventral pallidum, in
experiments which manipulate NAcc-related circuitry via changes
in natural appetite states (hungers, satieties) or via addictive drugs
(drug administration; long-term drug sensitization).
Results
Empirical tests: natural appetites and addictive drugs
To illustrate our proposal about the computation of incentive
salience, we now draw on two types of experiments designed to
expose dynamic physiological modulation of cue-triggered ‘want-
ing’, as posited in equation (3). The first experiment uses the
natural motivation state of salt appetite to change the incentive
salience of a salt CS. The second experiment uses a dopamine-
stimulating drug amphetamine and/or enduring drug-induced
sensitization to activate mesolimbic NAcc-related systems and
change the incentive salience of a sucrose CS.
Test 1: natural appetite states dynamically elevate CS
‘wanting’. The natural homeostatic state of salt appetite is
especially useful for probing dynamic shifts in incentive value
because this natural appetite can be introduced as a novel
experimental state. Novelty is enabled because sodium deficiency
is almost never experienced by laboratory animals or modern
humans who eat diets that contain plenty of sodium chloride. Salt
appetite emerges only in physiological states when sodium is
depleted from the body (e.g., caused by drugs or by subsistence on
a very low-sodium diet). Salt appetite causes intense elevation in
both salt ‘wanting’ and salt ‘liking’ [51,69]. At the same time, a CS
(a sound, sight or a sour or bitter taste) previously associated with
the salty taste also is dynamically revised from negative to positive
in both incentive salience value and hedonic value [10–12,50,70].
We set a strict criterion for what must occur if those signals
constitute a dynamic enhancement of incentive salience: neural
signals for CS value in ventral pallidum signals must dynamically
and selectively rise to a salt CS on its first ever presentation in a
sodium appetite state, even prior to re-tasting salt itself in the new
state. A neurobiological experiment in our lab was designed to test
the incentive salience hypothesis as modeled by Eqn (3) [12]. In it,
rats in a normal state were trained to associate a particular
auditory tone CS with unpleasantly-intense salt solution as UCS
(triple the saltiness of sea-water), and a different CS with a pleasant
sucrose solution as UCS; a third control CS meant nothing [12].
Neuronal firing was recorded in the rat’s ventral pallidum during
training. Only the CS for sucrose elicited high levels of firing.
Then a physiological state of sodium depletion was induced
overnight by injections of hormone-stimulating drugs (DOCA and
furosemide) to induce a relatively sudden salt appetite. The rats
had never experienced salt appetite before so the physiological
state was new to them, and they were not allowed to taste any salt
again until after the CS tests. In the new state, the CS tones were
each presented a number of times by themselves, while
mesocorticolimbic neural activations in their ventral pallidum
were recorded. The CSs were presented by themselves (in
extinction) so that no new experiences of the UCS tastes could
influence the computation of CS incentive values.
The crucial observation in the electrophysiological results was
that in the new salt appetite state, the salt CS now elicited a high
level of firing that was equal to or even higher than the sucrose CS
in the salt appetite state [12]. The dynamic elevation in firing
pattern to a salt CS (Figure 2) indicates that the change in
physiological state produced a dynamic elevation of incentive
salience value of the relevant previously-trained CS. This boost in
CS incentive coding was quite specific: it did not apply to a control
CS that predicted nothing, nor did it further boost firing to the CS
for sucrose.
Our additive model (Eqn 3b) can best capture these results,
presuming that the motivation valence of incentive salience
‘wanting’ reverses from negative to positive (similarly to how
hedonic ‘liking’ for intense salt reverses from ‘disliking’ during the
appetite state). The additive model of reward modulation (Eqn 3b)
explains this phenomenon as follows. Unpleasantly-intense salt
originally takes on a negative reward value, and its incentive
salience is ,0. However, under sodium depletion, incentive
salience causes k to take on a value far greater than 1, i.e., log k
can be a large positive value for a salt CS. This should shift the
reward value for salt associations sufficiently upward, so that salt
becomes positive-valued as opposed to negatively valued.
Alternatively, we note that neuronal firing can only change from
low to high or high to low, since a neuron’s firing rate can never go
below zero. Taken at face value, ‘wanting’, if represented linearly
in VP firing, might merely change from zero to high during a
particular state, without reversing valence. ‘Liking’, in contrast,
demonstrably reverses in valence from ‘disliked’ to ‘liked’,
requiring a separate neuronal coding mechanism. If VP firing to
a cue linearly reflected univalent changes in ‘wanting’ primarily,
then our multiplicative model of (Eqn 3a) would suffice to account
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as well as for the drug-related cases described below. However, it
seems possible in principle that a univalent neural change might
still encode a bivalent psychological shift in ‘wanting’. Resolving
this translation of univalent neural firing into bivalent psycholog-
ical values is beyond our current scope, though we have discussed
it at greater length in other papers [50,51,71].
We also note that hedonic ‘liking’ as well as incentive salience
‘wanting’ for salt UCS and CS would be enhanced during the
sodium appetite [51,71]. Still, the point of this experiment was to
show that the CS revaluation could occur as predicted by our
model without experiencing the new UCS ‘liking’ or ‘wanting’
values, because rats were not allowed to taste the salt UCS in the
new state until after the crucial test with the CSs.
Is the elevated incentive salience actually translated into
motivated action? Dynamic elevation of appetitive and consum-
matory behaviors may additionally be observed if a CS is provided
that supports a particular action, such as consumption behavior
(Figure 2). For example if a gustatory CS is used in an experiment
similar to above (such as a bitter or sour liquid as CS label, learned
by being mixed with saltiness as UCS), then later the CS for salt
(e.g., pure bitter solution or pure sour solution) by itself is becomes
ingested during a salt appetite state, even if no salt is then available
[10,50,70]. Previous studies in our lab and earlier ones by Fudim,
and by Rescorla and Freberg, showed that rats sought out and
selectively consumed a sour, bitter or other pure CS label that
once was associated with a salt UCS, even if the CS taste solution
was presented by itself without actual salt in the novel appetite test,
and even if the rat had never yet tasted salt during the sodium
depletion state (Figure 2). Such cases illustrate how natural
appetite states can dynamically modulate incentive salience for a
previously learned CS, guiding actions to ‘wanted’ targets, even
before relearning any new information about its UCS.
Effects of addictive drugs and mesolimbic sensitization
on incentive salience
A special case of incentive salience modulation is incentive-
sensitization: this occurs when drugs in the brain sensitize
mesolimbic dopamine-related systems, and similar but temporary
elevation of ‘wanting’ can be produced by directly injecting
amphetamine before a test [8,13,72–74]. We capitalized on these
drug-induced elevations in incentive salience to test the addiction-
related predictions of (Eqn 3a) for enhancing cue-triggered
wanting’ [8].
Test 2: addictive drugs activate and sensitize dopamine-
related ‘wanting’. In studies to tease apart ‘wanting’ from
‘liking’ and from learned predictions of reward, we used a simple,
serial paradigm containing two CSs that predicted a sucrose UCS
[13,75]. This serial CS paradigm helps separate the moment of
maximal learned prediction (triggered by the first CS1) from the
moment of maximal ‘wanting’ (triggered by the second CS2 that is
temporally closer to a terminal sugary reward UCS), from the
moment of maximum ‘liking’ (triggered by the sucrose UCS itself):
thus, the full series was CS1RCS2RUCS (Figure 3).
After training in that serial association, some rats were sensitized
by repeated binge-type doses of amphetamine [13]. Then, after a
Figure 2. Natural salt appetite dynamically enhances incentive salience of a salt CS. Neural coding of CS ‘wanting’ illustrated by firing in
ventral pallidum neurons (A). Ordinarily neurons in ventral pallidum that code CS for rewards fire to onset of an auditory tone CS that previously
predicted infusion of sucrose solution into the rat’s mouth (right column) but not to a CS for intense salt solution (A). A novel salt appetite state
causes the neurons to fire as vigorously to the CS for salt as to the CS for sucrose while responses to sucrose cues persist unchanged (A). From [12].
Translation of enhanced CS incentive salience into action during salt appetite (B). When measured behaviorally, a novel salt appetite state causes rats
to avidly consume a specific solution containing a gustatory CS (bitter or sour) that previously was paired with intense salt. Ordinarily the rats would
not prefer to consume either CS solution [10,50]. In all cases, the rats had not yet retasted actual salt UCS when they showed new ‘wanting’ of the CS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000437.g002
Computational Model of Incentive Salience
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 7 July 2009 | Volume 5 | Issue 7 | e10004371-month incubation period that allowed sensitization changes in
brain mesolimbic systems to grow, we recorded neuronal firing in
ventral pallidum to presentations of the CS1, CS2, and UCS
reward stimuli. Those tests were conducted both in the absence
and in the presence of an acute dose of amphetamine, on different
days (see Figure 3 for the experimental design and timeline).
Note that the first CS (i.e., CS1) predicts all following stimuli,
and because of temporal discounting, their magnitude will be in
descending order: V1,V2,r, since UCS (when treated as a point
reward) would be highest right when it is delivered. A pure TD
value-coding model therefore predicts that neuronal coding should
follow the same ordering, with activation to UCS being the largest.
However, according to a pure TD model, the sensitization or
administration of amphetamine should not immediately enhance
cached CS values until after further training (relearning) with
prediction errors from a potentially greater UCS after sensitiza-
tion. Only with relearning (i.e., post-sensitization learning about
surprising UCS) could the temporal difference prediction error
signal d ‘‘reboost’’ incentive salience attributions to the memory
representation of the prior conditioned stimuli. Such reboosting
based purely on associative learning requires re-experiencing the
UCS under the sensitized (or otherwise revalued) condition.
Figure 3. Selective amplification of CS incentive salience (not CS prediction or UCS hedonic impact) by transient amphetamine
intoxication and more permanent drug sensitization. Experimental design of the serial CS1/CS2/UCS procedure, and effects of sensitization
and amphetamine on neuronal firing profiles in ventral pallidum (A). The relative rank-ordering of neuronal responses to CS1/CS2/UCS is defined as
the ‘‘profile’’ of a neuron; it can be represented mathematically as the angle of a vector in a two dimensional space, where the two axes represent two
orthogonal contrasts formed from the three responses (B). The computation is such that this angular value indexing a response profile exists in a
continuum which 1) exhausts all possible firing patterns (i.e., relative orders in firing rates to these three types of stimuli); and 2) guarantees that
nearby values represents similar firing patterns. Temporal difference error-coding implies maximal response to CS1 which has the greatest prediction,
whereas value-coding implies maximal firing to UCS which has the highest hedonic value. By contrast, incentive-coding implies maximal firing to CS2
that has the greatest motivational impact as it immediately precedes the actual reward. The data panel shows firing in control condition contrasted
to the combination of amphetamine plus sensitization (C). The summary arrow panel shows the averaged neuronal response for each group of rats,
illustrating the additive increments produced by sensitization, amphetamine and combination of both (D). Data from [13].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000437.g003
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3) posits that any mesolimbic activation by psychostimulant
sensitization or by acute amphetamine administration will
immediately modulate the neuronal coding of a signal that carries
high incentive salience for a previously learned CS. In particular,
with respect to ordering of magnitudes, our model anticipates that
CS2 should receive greater motivational impact than CS1,
because it is closer in time to UCS and therefore most ‘wanted’
among CSs. Higher incentive salience of the CS2 was confirmed
in the experiment by videoanalyses that showed motivated
approach behaviors (nosepokes into the dish that delivered
sucrose) were much higher during the CS2 than the CS1. Our
prediction arises because in the serial Pavlovian conditioning
paradigm, r1=0 and r2=r, and Eqn (3a) indicates that ~ V V1~c r,
~ V V2~k r. The temporal discount factor c,1 and sensitization
manipulation produces k.1, thus ~ V V1v~ V V2.
In other words, because CS2 is the target of greatest incentive
salience, its neural signal should be most potently enhanced by
neural sensitization or by acute amphetamine administration that
activates brain mesolimbic dopamine systems.
Profile analysis supports incentive salience hypotheses
for limbic firing
To compare these neuronal coding formulations against our
model for incentive salience, we developed an analytic technique
called Profile Analysis to assess neuronal responses to CS1, CS2
and UCS [13,76].
Profile Analysis creates a quantitative index comparing the
ordering of the magnitudes of a neuron’s firing rates to the three
stimuli, CS1, CS2, and UCS (Figure 3). The profile for each unit is
defined as a vector in a two dimensional ‘‘profile space’’. The
direction of this vector reflects the rank-ordering of each neuron’s
firing rate responses to CS1, CS2 and UCS, while the magnitude of
thevectorreflectsthedegreetowhichtheintensityofresponsetoone
stimulus dominates the responses to others). Inhibition of neuronal
firing to a particular stimulus pulls coding vectors in opposite
directionfrom excitations.Allpossible firing profilesarerepresented
on a continuum of circular scale (360u), with nearby directions
(angles) representing similar neuronal firing profiles. The profile
analysis is performed on each individual neuron, and subsequently
aggregated to obtain the entire neuronal population response.
More formally, let us denote each neuron’s firing rate to CS1,
CS2, and UCS (after normalizing to baseline) as x, y, z respectively
[77]. The relative rank-ordering of these three numbers according
to their magnitude represents the ‘‘profile’’ of a neuron’s responses
to the stimuli, and it can be represented mathematically as a vector
in a two dimensional space. For each neuron we construct a two-
dimensional unit vector (u,n)from the three numbers x, y, z, such
that they (i.e., the profile-representing unit vectors) are ‘‘equally
spaced’’ in the projected two-dimensional subspace orthogonal to
the direction [1,1,1]:
u,v ½  ~ x,y,z ½ 
cos(az1200) sin(az1200)
cos(a) sin(a)
cos(a{1200) sin(a{1200)
2
6 4
3
7 5 ð6Þ
where the ‘‘anchoring’’ parameter a can be chosen arbitrarily. For
simplicity, we chose a=0; in this case,
u~(2y{x{z)=2
v~
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
(x{z)=2
ð7Þ
The components of the profile vector [u,v] thus computed,
according to Eqn. (6) in general and Eqn. (7) in particular,
capture the two orthogonal contrasts formed among the three
dependent variables x, y, z, such that any other contrast is a
rotation in the two-dimensional space. This vector’s magnitude
R~ u2zv2    1=2
~((x{y)
2z(y{z)
2z(z{x)
2)
1=2=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
ð8Þ
represents the extent to which the neuron’s firing rates, x, y, z, are
differentially modulated by the three types of stimuli (CS1, CS2,
and UCS), or in other words, it represents the variance of
responses across the stimuli. The vector’s direction
h~tan{1(v=u) ð9Þ
reflects the type of rank-ordering of the magnitudes of these firing
rates. This procedure is both exhaustive (i.e., all neurons can be
characterized) and faithful (i.e., the distance between the angles is
monotonically associated with the magnitude of difference in two
profiles).
Of particular interest to this study are the regions corresponding
to response dominance by a particular stimulus (Figure 3). The
region spanning 60u to 180u is where CS1 dominates the response
profile and represents neurons that are responsive to the CS1 cue
which carries the most predictive information about subsequent
stimuli. This is designated as the prediction or ‘‘TD error-coding’’
area. The region spanning 260u to 60u represents dominant
neural firing to CS2, which occurs at moment of highest
motivation excitement, and we denote it as the motivational or
‘‘incentive-coding’’ area. Finally, the region spanning 180u to 300u
represents dominance by the reward itself (UCS) and it is
designated the hedonic or ‘‘value-coding’’ area. Strictly speaking,
our incentive salience theory predicts CS2.CS1.UCS for
incentive-coding neurons, whereas if neurons obey a TD learning
model, one predicts that the relative ordering of the magnitude of
responses to the three stimuli after learning is CS1.CS2.UCS
for error-coding neurons and UCS.CS2.CS1 for value-coding
neurons. The rationale is similar to a method proposed by one of
us earlier (called ‘‘Locus Analysis’’) to characterize neurons in the
primary motor cortex [78].
Incentive shifts in neural profiles after amphetamine
administration or drug sensitization
The results of the amphetamine and sensitization experiment
revealed that VP neurons ordinarily signalled best the prediction
value of a CS, responding maximally to CS1 (Figure 3). Thus, in
the normal state, these limbic circuits reflect the standard
prediction error model. However, mesolimbic activation or
sensitization changed this profile by enhancing only incentive
salience signals to the CS2, at the expense of the signal for CS1
(and without altering UCS signal) [13] (Figure 4).
The incentive shift toward CS2 was even greater for the
combination of sensitization plus amphetamine administration at
the time of test. The effects of the various mesolimbic
dopaminergic activations can be visualized as the rotation of the
Population Profile Vectors (Figure 4). Thus, it was concluded that
while VP neurons in control animals (after training) tend to follow
a TD error coding profile, mesolimbic dopaminergic activation
causes the neuronal response profiles to shift towards encoding
incentive salience. This shift corresponds to our motivational
transform computation model, and to the idea that mesolimbic
stimulations enhanced k.
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increase, we note that the enhancements of neural firing to CS2
produced by amphetamine and by drug sensitization were evident
right away on the very first presentations of the CS2 in the new
sensitization and/or amphetamine state. That is, as predicted by
our k model, the incentive value of the CS2 was dynamically
increased without need of re-learning about CS-UCS association,
and without additional pairings with the UCS in the transformed
state [13].
Does amphetamine or sensitization of incentive salience
translate into behavioral ‘wanting’ too? In previous studies using
a rigorous behavioral test of cue-triggered ‘wanting’ (based on a
Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer design or PIT), we and others
have confirmed that acute amphetamine administration and/or
prior drug sensitization both enhance peaks of cue-triggered
‘wanting’ for sucrose reward (Figure 4). In PIT, the phasic peaks of
cue-triggered ‘wanting’ are manifest as a burst of pressing by the
rat on a lever that previously earned sucrose reward: these peaks
were dynamically enhanced by microinjection of amphetamine
directly into the nucleus accumbens, or by sensitizing drug binges
given weeks earlier [72,73] (Figure 4). The ‘wanting’ enhance-
ments occurred even on the first presentations of the CS in the
new physiological states of mesolimbic activation, just as in the
neural firing experiments above (Figure 4) [72,73]. And the
elevations came and went with the coming and going of the
physical CS+ stimulus, which lasted about 30 sec each. Such
dynamic enhancement of CS incentive salience is also consistent
with other behavioral demonstrations of incentive motivation
enhancement by pharmacological dopamine activation or by
psychostimulant-induced neural sensitization [72,73,79,80], even
in the absence of additional learning [81–83]. Our conclusion is
also compatible with other behavioral evidence that the most
predictive CS can be dissociated from the most ‘wanted’ CS
[84,85]. Thus it seems safe to conclude that dynamic increases in
incentive salience are expressed in behavior as well as in neural
activation [15,86–90].
Discussion
As posited by our computational model (Eqns 3, 3a, 3b),
dynamic enhancements of CS incentive salience can be empiri-
cally observed in both neural and behavioral measures of cue-
triggered ‘wanting’. Enhancements were caused by relevant
physiological changes, such as natural salt appetite, and addic-
tion-related amphetamine intoxication and long term sensitization
that modulate brain mesolimbic systems involving dopamine. All
of these physiological manipulations revealed dynamic modulation
of CS-triggered ‘wanting’ as posited by our model (Eqns 3; 3a; 3b).
Experimental caveats
It is important to acknowledge that each experiment above is
only an imperfect test of the model. The VP sensitization and
amphetamine experiments hinged on the assumption that our
sequential Pavlovian design decoupled the maximal predictive
impact of CS1 from the maximal incentive impact of CS2. If the
assumption were false, the conclusion would be weakened.
Likewise, the salt CS study failed to cleanly separate ‘wanting’
from hedonic ‘liking’, because both were increased together during
a natural sodium appetite. However, each experiment also carries
strengths to counter these weaknesses. The sensitization-amphet-
amine experiment cleanly dissociated ‘wanting’ from ‘liking’
because the dopamine-based activations enhanced ‘wanting’
without at all enhancing sucrose ‘liking’. The salt experiment
cleanly dissociated incentive ‘wanting’ from cached predictions
gained by previous learning, without requiring serial CSs, because
the previously learned CS value was negative and was dynamically
reversed into positive valence at test by a natural specific appetite.
Thus some confidence is gained by noting that our conclusions rest
Figure 4. Behavioral confirmation of dynamic amplification of cue-triggered by amphetamine activation of mesolimbic systems.
Transient ‘wanting’ comes and goes with the cue (A). Amphetamine microinjection in nucleus accumbens dynamically magnifies ‘wanting’ for sugar
reward – but only in presence of reward cue (CS+). Cognitive expectations and ordinary wanting are not altered (reflected in baseline lever pressing
in absence of cue and during irrelevant cue, CS2) (B). From [72].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000437.g004
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experimental result.
Forms of ‘wanting’ modulation
Comparing versions (Eqns 3a and 3b), we note that Eqn (3a)
could be a standard way to express the generic model (Eqn 3) as a
multiplicative gain-control mechanism, which generally applies to
all univalent cases of modulation. These include enhancements of
‘wanting’ by amphetamine activation of mesolimbic dopamine
systems and by permanent sensitization of mesolimbic systems, as
shown here, and would also apply to natural cases such as a
palatable food becoming more valuable in hunger. It would
similarly apply to univalent downshifts in incentive value from
good to less good or neutral (e.g., physiological satiety or
dopamine suppression). Further, Eqn (3a) would also apply to
changes in aversiveness from bad to worse (or vice versa) for fear,
disgust or other negative evaluations that involve a negative
version of motivation salience, such as changes in active fear or in
psychotic paranoia produced by dopamine-blocking drugs or by
psychological mood manipulations [53,54,91] (Figure 1).
Alternatively, Eqn (3b) expresses the generic model as an
additive version, which is intended to account for special cases
where incentive value actually reverses valence between positive
and negative poles. Those include reversal of incentive salience for
intense salt from negatively ‘unwanted’ to positively ‘wanted’
during salt appetite, and would also include flips from ‘wanted’ to
‘unwanted’ such as when a sucrose taste is converted from good to
bad by aversion conditioning (i.e., pairing as CS with nausea as
UCS), or flips between desire and dread [53,90].
Comparing incentive salience model to standard
reinforcement learning models. How does our model (Eqns
3; 3a; 3b) contrast to a cached-value TD model or to a flexible
tree-search model involving a cognitive state space? According to a
standard TD reinforcement model, optimal policy is invariant (i.e.,
remains unchanged) if the entire vector of primary rewards in
every state is subject to the same affine transform (r2.ar+b, a.0)
with fixed a,b. Cached values are relatively stable, and able to
produce the same optimal behavior across a wide range of
homeostatic/motivational states. But they are not able to
dynamically modulate after a shift without further retraining.
The dynamic situations here, however, were very different and
not amenable to a stable solution strategy, as the motivational
revaluation occurred without the individual having had a chance
to relearn. The cached value-function of each state (CSs) would
not have been adjusted until after the next encounter with primary
reward (UCS); the UCS itself would be immediately modulated by
the physiological shift but would still need to be presented to effect
a re-evaluation of CS.
More flexible are tree-search models, sometimes called model-
based systems because they model or map the world in a way that
explicitly represents goal values and relationships in a nested tree
or similar recursive structure [14,17,21,22,39,40,92]. Psychologi-
cal counterparts include cognitive maps of goal outcomes, with
values obtained by episodic memories of experience with those
goals in states similar to current conditions, and understanding of
act-outcome relationships needed to obtain those goals
[17,18,89,92–94]. Still, some model-based formulations and
psychological counterparts are constrained by whether the tree
contains sufficient information to compute a new value in a state,
which for some systems may depend on whether the goal has ever
been tasted before while in a similar state [17,18]. For example, as
Dickinson and Balleine put it in describing the behavior of rats
when guided by cognitive act-outcome relations involving
hedonically positive memories of a sucrose goal they used to work
for, but which had subsequently been devalued by taste-aversion
conditioning: ‘‘we gave (some of) our rats the opportunity to taste
the sugar after they had acquired a latent aversion to it. This re-
tasting had a profound effect when we subsequently tested their
desire to search for the sugar water by lever pressing. In the
absence of the re-tasting, they behaved as though they were
ignorant of their aversion…, whereas those that had re-tasted the
sugar water showed little propensity to seek it out again (the
devalued sugar water)’’ (p. 103) [17]. That is, the rat’s cognitive
system needed to re-taste the sugar in order to know that the
former reward had become unpleasant and was no longer a
positive goal. To the extent that computational models aim to
capture real psychological cognition, retasting may remain an
important feature of many model-based systems
[17,18,21,22,28,39,40,44].
Of course an empirical need for retasting by rat brains (or
human brains) does not necessarily imply that all model-based RL
computational mechanisms necessarily require retasting. Recently,
Daw, Niv and Dayan have explicitly proposed an alternative tree
model that can update without needing to retaste, using
feedforward recalculation of goal value in a full look-ahead tree
even before the goal is experienced [39,95]. Such a model might
be able to accomplish revaluations of CS value prior to UCS
retasting such as those demonstrated in our experiments.
Yet differences remain between our Pavlovian-guided incentive
salience model (mediated by mesolimbic brain circuits) and a
cognitive map or full look-ahead tree model (plausibly mediated by
cortical brain circuits) [39,95]. One difference is that attribution of
incentive salience to a CS makes the cue itself become
motivationally ‘wanted’, beyond being a signal or trigger to ‘want’
the UCS goal [84,85]. Another difference is that mesolimbic
circuits computing k modulate only the primary reward
motivation and not state-values or state-action values. Loosely
speaking, our model (Eqns 3; 3a; 3b) is analogous to one-step look-
ahead in a model-based (tree-search) approach. Consider that cue-
triggered ‘wanting’ shoots up upon presentation of a CS, but
importantly, also goes down again nearly as soon as the CS is
taken away. Coupling to CS is evident in behavioral PIT
experiments, where lever-pressing peaks fade away as soon as
the CS is removed (see figure 4) – even though the salt appetite,
dopamine drug, or sensitization state that enhanced the cue’s
motivation-eliciting power persist. Neuronal VP firing peaks are
even shorter, and linked to the onset of the CS presentation, and
then typically decay within a second. Neither baseline levels of
lever pressing rates nor neuronal firing rates were reliably
enhanced at moments in between cues.
A full tree-model is usually thought to have an advantage of
providing a stable cognitive map of declarative goals and available
actions within the tree’s representation of the world. Having once
successfully recomputed the goal in advance of retasting the UCS,
then, it may seem odd that a full look-ahead tree model should
immediately abandon the goal value again as soon as the CS
disappears, and to repeat the cycle each time the CS comes or
goes. Yet to accommodate our data, some such transient and
repetitive adjustment of a full-tree model would be required.
Transience, on the other hand, is quite typical of motivational
states. In particular, the incentive salience mechanism is especially
compatible with transient peaks in ‘wanting’ being tied to CS
presence because the Bindra-Toates rules of Pavlovian motivation
specify that a synergy exists between CS presence and current
mesolimbic state, which controls the intensity of motivation at
each moment [1–5,8,96]. The physical presence of a Pavlovian CS
is a crucial factor in generating incentive salience, and a sporadic
CS can lead to up-and-down changes in ‘wanting’. This synergy
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more powerful motivators, as well as why a food CS can trigger an
increase in appetite for its UCS in a not particularly hungry person
or a drug CS trigger relapse in an addict [2–5,7,8,19,89,96,97].
Multiple motivation-learning systems. We should
acknowledge again that we do not suggest that incentive salience
is the only computational form of goal-directed system operating
in the brains of rats or people, any more than stimulus-stimulus
Pavlovian associations are the only form of reward learning.
Incentive salience ‘wanting’ is but one mechanism of motivation,
occurring alongside others. For example, ample evidence
described elsewhere indicates that ‘wanting’ (with quotation
marks: incentive salience) exists alongside ordinary wanting
(without quotation marks: cognitive predictions), which may
plausibly be based on full look-ahead cognitive representations
of expected goal values and their related act-outcome strategies to
obtain those goals [3,7,14,17,18]. Ordinarily, wanting and
‘wanting’ act together to guide behavior toward the same goals,
with incentive salience serving to add motivation ‘oomph’ to
cognitive representations. But under some important conditions
the two motivation mechanisms may diverge. For example,
divergence can lead to ‘irrational wanting’ in addiction for a
target that the individual does not cognitively want, nor
predictively expect to be of high value [7–9]. Our current model
may help to computationally capture the incentive salience limb of
that divergence.
Future challenges
Finally, we stress that our model (Eqns 3, 3a, 3b) is not meant as
a finished model of incentive salience, but only is an incremental
step towards more adequate computational models. Several
important challenges remain. One challenge for a future incentive
salience model is to better solve the specificity problem involved in
the question of ‘what to want most’? That problem includes
describing how specific types of k (e.g., sodium appetite, hunger,
drug sensitization) interact with specific CSs and their UCS
rewards (e.g., salt, food, drugs) to determine the direction of
maximal attribution of incentive salience toward a particular
target. A related problem concerns the control of how sharply
‘wanting’ is focused by amygdala-related systems on one CS
motivational magnet [48,85], or on one UCS target in a winner-
take-all fashion (as when an addict excessively ‘wants’ only drugs),
or instead is spread somewhat over several targets (as when the
addict also excessively ‘wants’ to gamble or engage in sex) [8].
Another challenge is to model the relation of incentive salience
‘reboosting’ (via incremental pairings of CS and UCS) to dynamic
modulation (as shown here for a specific CS). A final challenge is
to better capture the computational differences between Pavlov-
ian-based ‘wanting’ described here versus tree-based cognitive goal
systems and cached-based habit learning systems, and to better
understand the conditions that determine whether those three
systems cohere or diverge.
Conclusion
To summarize, we have proposed a computational model of
incentive salience as a motivational gating mechanism that
dynamically responds to post-learning shifts in physiological states
when encoding a relevant CS for reward. Our computation of
incentive salience integrates a current change in physiological state
with previously learned associations between a CS and its state-
relevant UCS reward to generate ‘wanting’ in a dynamic and
reversible fashion.
The computation of incentive salience outlined here implies that
cue-triggered ‘wanting’ amounts to activating associations that
exist between CS and UCS, and then dynamically recomputing
motivational value based on current physiological state to generate
the motivational magnet property of a reward cue [2,3,7,8]. In
natural appetites, like salt appetite or food hunger, the dynamic
modulation is adaptive, and guides motivated behavior towards an
appropriate incentive without need for stable experience-gained
knowledge of the goal. In addicts, amplified motivation may
maladaptively pull the addict like a magnet towards compulsively
‘wanted’ drugs, and so make it harder to escape from the addiction
[8,13,98].
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